


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*Prefaces*

*For*

THE HONORS COLLOQUIA 1967-68

*On*

"THE RESPONSIBLE SELF"

**In this issue:**

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By Dr. Robert E. Bergmark  
Chairman, Department of Philosophy

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By  
Dr. T. W. Lewis  
Associate Professor of Religion

## FOREWORD

The faculty of any college has the task of observing the world and man and reflecting on these observations. Their reflections are thought through in the light of the accumulated wisdom of men, conveniently and often too neatly compartmentalized.

The best teachers are those who refuse to be bound by their specialties. They address themselves to the intriguing question of the human enterprise in all its varied forms. They insist on asking, in their diverse ways, what it means to be a human being. They learn from each other and from their students.

The reflections printed here were prepared for the Honors Colloquia at Millsaps in the spring of 1967. The theme of these sessions was "The Responsible Self." These studies, along with others, were presented as stimuli to the thinking of fourteen students enrolled in the Honors Program. With these reflections, in conjunction each time with common readings, three teachers did their job: they provoked students representing many specialties to searching dialogue among themselves and with their teachers.

Millsaps has always sought to inform its alumni, and to aid them to continue the kind of reflection that keeps them alert, responsive, and responsible in a world that refuses to stand still. These papers continue that effort. We hope that in this permanent form they will provoke the lively and sometimes agonizing thought they produced among the students who heard them.

Dr. Lee Reiff  
Chairman, Honors Council



## THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF

By

Dr. Robert E. Bergmark

Chairman, Department of Philosophy

The problem which engages our attention in these colloquia is, at once, as old as western philosophy and as fresh and persistent as the arrival of each new day. For twenty-five hundred years thinkers have been suggesting possible solutions to the enigma posed by human experience of self-awareness, yet still, to this day, there is no one clear solution to which all thoughtful men may repair. Each solution has its attendant problems, and the decision to hold a certain solution in preference to others is, at the same time, a decision to live with the problems which belong to that solution. Many a solution has been, and is, held with the smug assurance that arguers for other positions are just "beating dead horses" or that these other positions are "outdated," but such smugness is question-begging and stultifying. The problem of the self remains a genuine problem and needs to be confronted openly, critically, and honestly.

Even when this is agreed to, however, and one attempts to turn to the task at hand, he finds himself trapped in a maze of terminology. The term soul, hoary with antiquity and still playing a mythic role in some theological discourse, is no longer useful for non-theological purposes. Psychologists stopped talking about souls a long time ago. The term mind, says Gilbert Ryle, conjures up the image of a "ghost in a machine." Even the term consciousness is suspect. Indeed, it is sometimes facetiously said that psychology long ago lost its soul, more recently it lost its mind, and now it is on the verge of losing consciousness.

Out of the past has come a welter of such terms: psyche, soul, self, spirit, mind, consciousness, ego, subject, man, person, personality, human being. They have been used in a great variety of ways bearing a great variety of meanings. There is scarcely any way to avoid using such terms, and yet when we do use them we stand in danger of being misunderstood, for not only do they bear the meaning we intend, but often they carry a trace of fossilized meaning from the long ago. Ambiguity is almost inescapable. Of all of these terms, perhaps the term self is the least ambiguous and the most clearly descriptive of what we are attempting to investigate, and thus we shall make greater use of it than



of the others. Nevertheless, even the term self must be used with care.

By what characteristics may we recognize this self which we are seeking to study? First of all, as pointed out by Edgar Brightman, there is the experience called self-consciousness or self-awareness. Such experience is a totality for us, a complete whole of remembering, thinking, feeling, emoting, choosing, and sensing, all belonging somehow to one experiencing subject — a **unitas multiplex**, a unity in multiplicity, as the psychologist William Stern put it. The second characteristic is that of the activity of the self. Castell makes much of this characteristic in his distinction between activities and processes. Even in its response to stimuli the self seems other than passive, and in decisions, choices, and other creative activity this characteristic seems to be manifested. A third characteristic is a sense of privacy. When an individual asks, "Do you know what I think?" only he can report directly on the matter; others can only guess.

Fourth is the experience of a sense of meaning. Not only do our senses provide us with basic raw data of sights and sounds, but somehow these sights and sounds are translated into a world of referents, of relationships, of inferences. And somehow the individual feels himself in some sense at the center of that process of translation. A fifth characteristic is the experience of time- and space-transcendence possible in imagination. The conscious self can recall the past, anticipate the future, and imagine objects far removed in space. And finally, sixth, is the experience of value. Not only are we aware, but we are aware of desiring, of approving, of enjoying, of feeling satisfied. We find ourselves making distinctions between what is and what we claim ought to be, and use terms such as goals, ideals, and responsibilities.

These six characteristics provide us with some notion of what it is we are looking for when we go seeking the self, and with this description in hand we turn to Alburey Castell's book, **The Self in Philosophy**.

Castell develops his book around three main distinctions. First of all he draws a distinction between what he calls process and what he calls activity. Then, having indicated that he believes selves belong to the realm of activity rather than process, he distinguishes between the agent view and the no-agent view of activity. Finally, in a semi-developed afterthought, he attempts a quite suggestive distinction between sciences and disciplines. We turn first to his distinction between process and activity.

Process, according to Castell's usage, refers to the casual relationships in the space-time order. Billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B and billiard ball B begins to roll. Heat is applied to a pot of water and the water boils. Heat is applied to a piece of metal and the metal expands. An object is turned loose from a bridge and it falls into the water below. A hen's egg is fertilized, and twenty-one days later there emerges a baby chick equipped with bones, sinews, flesh, skin, beak, visceral organs, eyes, ears, nose, yellow fuzz gizzard and much besides. Each of these is a representation of process, each a portion of the ongoingness of things which constitutes the appropriate subject-matter of science. If we should ask, "Why did the metal expand?" we would simply be asking for a description of the process within which the antecedent application of heat is followed by the consequent expansion of the metal. But what if we should ask, "Did it want to expand?" Would it prefer to contract when heated? When it expanded, was it operating on short-term or long-term principles of operation?

When confronted by such questions, our first thought might be that they are simply meaningless, but this is not the case. Rather, it is precisely because they are meaningful that we find them out of place in such a context. It is because of the meaning they bear that we charge them with the fallacy of hypostatization. They suggest what Castell refers to as activities rather than processes. They personify things. They fail to allow for the appropriate distinction between things and selves, between processes and activities.

Castell suggests (pp. 21-25) fifteen ways in which an activity differs from a process. (1) Activity is fallible, subject to error. Process is neither fallible nor infallible, but simply occurs. The description of process may be in error, but the description is activity rather than process. (2) Activity is purposive. Do you want to get credit for these colloquia? The form of this question is exactly the same as the one above which asked if the metal wanted to expand, yet here it fits whereas there it did not fit. (3) Activity is experimental and tentative. The process going on inside the hen's egg is surely not experimental. Whatever is occurring is occurring. The embryologist may experiment with incubation procedures, but then he is engaging in activity, not process. (4) Activity is guided by reference to criteria. It criticizes and evaluates itself. The expanding metal does not worry about whether it is expanding too swiftly or too slowly. Selves do worry about such things, and sometimes go on diets.



(5) Activity is reasoned. In ordinary circumstances, at least, we expect selves to be able to justify their behavior by giving reasons. In processes we look for causes, in selves we look for reasons. (6) Activity suggests the presence of alternative possibilities, not in the sense of statistical probabilities but in the sense of choice. Metals do not choose their rate of expansion, but technologists can improve the temperature control of this room through choices of appropriate metals to be used in the thermostats. The former is process, the latter is activity. (7) Activity suggests the presence of responsibility. Selves are held accountable for their behavior whereas things are not. If process can be demonstrated, such as the effect of a brain tumor upon human behavior, then the person is freed from this accountability. (8) Activity is corrigible. Process, not subject to error, is likewise not subject to correction. But when error is recognized, selves then take steps to correct the situation. (9) Activity is meaningful in a way in which process is not. We can say of a process that it "makes sense," but this is activity passing judgment on process, not process passing judgment upon itself. (10) Activity is judgmental. It validates and verifies. It finds certain claims meaningful and others meaningless, some acceptable and some unacceptable. Such behavior is completely foreign to process.

(11) Activity has presuppositions. Any attempt to deny this would itself involve certain presuppositions. (12) Activity involves the distinction between the actual and the ideal; the distinction between the description of what is and the prescription of what ought to be. (13) Activity is educable. The person in error may not be able, unaided, to correct his error. Aid in such a situation would be education. (14) Activity lacks spatial characteristics. It cannot be described as long or short, wide or narrow, thick or thin, round or square. Such spatial characteristics simply do not apply to activities. And finally (15), activity often involves response to a challenge. Process has its stimulus-response reaction, but only activity has its challenge-response action.

The point Castell wants to make with this long enumeration of the characteristics of activities has to do with the nature of the search we are undertaking. We begin not with the definition of some mysterious, esoteric, metaphysical, substantial soul; we begin, rather, with empirical data gleaned from everyday human experience. And on the basis of this human experience he wants to conclude that in this world in which we find ourselves there are two basically different orders of behavior: the behavior of things

in the space-time order called *process*, and the behavior of conscious and intelligent selves called *activity*.

The second main distinction which Castell attempts to make in this book, now that he has concluded that selves are found within the realm of activity, is the distinction between the agent view and the no-agent view of activity. Up to this point in the book there is little difficulty in understanding what Castell is saying. One may or may not agree with his conclusions thus far, but we know what he means. When he begins to talk about the no-agent view of activity, however, we are not always so sure that we can follow him. It is clear that a process view is a no-agent view—no question about that. It is likewise clear that an agent view presupposes an activity view—no question about that. But an activity view that is also a no-agent view seems somehow contradictory. When one reviews the fifteen characteristics of activity he wonders how these characteristics, from an activity point of view, would be possible without an agent, an actor, a doer.

Of course, we then realize that the main argument that Castell is supporting here is not the agent view broadly conceived, but the agent view narrowly conceived as substance. However many may be able to follow him in the notion that selves belong to the realm of activity, the great majority of those will boggle at the use of the term substance. Agent is enough; substance is too much. And yet substance is the only new item added to activity in this new section.

Along with the notion of the substantiality of the agent are the characteristics of identity, continuity, possibility of choice, educability. Anyone who assumes the process view will either not use these terms or drastically redefine them. Anyone who assumes the activity view has already adopted them. All of them, that is, except the notion of the agent as substance. Not even Castell can manage to provide substance with a meaningful referent.

Nevertheless, in presenting the distinction between the realm of process and the realm of activity Castell has done an exceptionally good job of describing the essential nature of the problem of the self. He is at his best, perhaps, when he is asking questions. He is at his worst, perhaps, when he is dredging up quotations from the J. B. Watson era. All in all, he confronts us with the basic issues, and that, after all, is what we should be after.



## THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY THE SELF IN THE MODERN NOVEL

A Commentary on James Joyce's

### PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN

By Dr. Shirley Callen

Associate Professor of English

In this array of disciplines treating the topic of "the responsible self," the point has recently been made that the major aim of science is helping man to understand and master his environment. It is appropriate for me to introduce this discussion of literature and of Joyce's novel by pointing out that literature shares that goal, even to the point of interpreting the term "environment" in a restricted, physical sense. To a surprising degree in our urban, industrialized culture literature is apt to deal with man's relationship to his physical environment as well as dealing with interpersonal relationships and with abstractions. To illustrate, **Portrait** has an urbanized setting and considerable treatment of intellectual matters; a major recollection of the novel would concern those abstractions of religion, philosophy and art treated as such in the novel. But at the same time there are frequent and significant recurrences of images from the physical environment, even including a motif of the medieval elements: earth, air, fire and water.

However, these images are not included simply as description or to delineate a character's relationship with nature. They are subsumed in the total purpose of creating the "portrait" of the title, the shaping of the "self" of Stephen Daedalus. They become a significant factor in communicating that shaping, just as significant as Stephen's relations to his social and intellectual environment, if not as obvious as the interpersonal relationships.

Here we might return to the comparison of disciplines made in the opening, but now to point out a contrast, in another sweeping generalization: One major difference between the areas of science and literature is that impersonality and objectivity are sought in science, whereas literature always involves some subjectivity, some interpersonal relationship. In some forms of literature, such as lyric poetry, the interpersonal relationship might appear to be a simple, direct connection of writer and reader. In many forms of literature, as in essays, the personality and subjectivity of the writer may be subdued. We may need to be reminded of the

personality, of the fallible self behind the writing, as Thoreau humorously reminds us at the beginning of **Walden**. "In most books, the I, or first person is omitted; in this it will be retained; that, in respect to egotism, is the main difference," Thoreau wrote. "We commonly do not remember that it is, after all, always the first person that is speaking."

Even in the earliest narratives and epics and dramas, there is apt to be a more complex interpersonal relationship; namely, the three-way connection of author, character and reader. With the modern trend to the "invisible" or "effaced author", even in poetry, the reader does not have the reliable, helpful guideposts of a personal communication like Shelley's "I fall upon the thorns of life. I bleed!" There are very few novelists' intrusions, like those of Hawthorne, to analyze a character or to point the moral of the story. Almost without exception in modern fiction the reader is confronted with characters in action—as happens in **Portrait**—and left to muddle through, making his own judgments. This approach, with its supposed moral objectivity and restraint, is what helped to make Joyce's collection of short stories, **Dubliners**, such an innovation and **cause celebre** when, after nine years' dispute over its contents, it was finally published.

However, it is the "in" thing in literary criticism these days to argue that, even back in the good old days, relations of author to reader were never that simple and direct. The "in" word for dealing with this possible multiplicity of selves in the relations of author to character to reader is the term **persona**, a term that might apply to a construction of character distinct from the author, to the author as character in the work, or even to the apparently personal author-speaker, as in a poem. There is a current abundance of papers from graduate schools such as "The Persona of Dante in **The Divine Comedy**" or "The Persona of Ezra Pound."

In an excellent essay entitled "The Mysteries of Identity: A Theme in Modern Literature" (American Scholar, XXXIV (Autumn, 1965, 569-586), Robert Langbaum's opening paragraph is a commentary on the term, leading to a very interesting conclusion:

One of the most fashionable literary terms these days is **persona** — which is the Latin word for the mask that actors used to wear in the Greek and Roman theater. The currency of the term suggests that the identity of the author and his characters, and the distinction between them, has become a problem. When critics call characters in poems and plays and



novels personae, they may mean one of two different things. They may mean that the characters are masks through which the author speaks, or they may mean that the characters have nothing to do with the author but are the masks or types necessary in order that the action may be played out. With both meanings of the word persona, the critics are saying that literature is or ought to be impersonal.

Mr. Langbaum's last sentence seems to contradict my indication that literature has been, is, and should continue to be interpersonal. But a complete reading of the essay would show, I think, that Mr. Langbaum would agree with my next massive generalization: that only the literary techniques of that interpersonal communication have changed; that to whatever degree it is true that literature has become more impersonal, it is because **real** people have become more impersonal. That is, of course, that due to any number of influences from biology, psychology, philosophy, etc., the concept of person — or "self" as treated here — has changed radically from the traditional concept that prevailed into the nineteenth century: the concept of the self as a stable, identifiable, separate entity, definitely established in different points of time in a stable universe. It is true that character has always been treated as somewhat dynamic in literature — plot is rarely a matter of external action only — but it is only in the twentieth century that we find the emergent view of a fluid ego or the portrayal of the consciousness as a flux of memory, perception, and reasoning and as a welter of sensations and reactions. The self (or ego) might be viewed as a jet of vitality common to the race, sex, or social group; it might illustrate a mythic pattern. In Norman Mailer's terms (used in **Advertisements of Myself!**) a character is treated more as a "vector in a network of forces than as a static character in a crystalized field."

In reaction to the "truths" of psychology and philosophy such as environmental determinisms and to the social forces toward isolation in a "lonely crowd," and toward fragmentation of the self, there is apt to appear in literature the pessimistic view that there can be no possible structuring of self in the old sense of a stable independent, free-willed entity. This view can lead to the question, Can there be a real self? As an example from a different art form, Ingmar Bergman's latest film, called **Persona**, deals with two women, a psychiatric nurse and her actress patient, who not only change roles but actual identities.

This example would show that the difficulty of "identifying" characters becomes not merely a question of technique, but of

theme as well. The "question" of identity easily becomes the "quest" for identity, which (as Mr. Langbaum noted) is such a prominent, often reiterated theme in twentieth century literature. For instance, Elia Kazan's recent, much publicized novel, **The Arrangement**, is about a middle-aged man who shatters his conventional, successful life to search for his "real" identity. I might add here, too, what I judge to be an anachronistic attempt to read the theme into much earlier literature; personally, I doubt that Ulysses ever had an instant's doubt about his identity, and yet **The Odyssey** is now sometimes treated as a very active "quest for identity."

Indeed, the question of identity is so pervasive in modern thought that a relevant observation might be drawn here from Robert Ardrey, the semi-biologist-cum-anthropologist who has received much attention for his two books, **African Genesis** and **The Territorial Imperative**, the second arguing that man's basic tie is territorial, that man has an "instinct" involving "property." Mr. Ardrey offers a great number of examples—including baboons, prairie dogs, and Israelis — to support his revision of the previously accepted basic drives:

I suggest that there are three beginnings . . . which psychologically motivate the behavior of all higher animals, including man. They are the needs for identity, for stimulation, and for security. How low and how ancient these needs may be in the evolutionary scale we have no means as yet to guess. For all we know they may be the primordial psychological necessities of life itself.

Identity, stimulation, security: Think of these in terms of their opposites. We shun anonymity, dread boredom and seek to dispel anxiety. We grasp at identification, yearn for stimulation, conserve or gain security. [At this point Mr. Ardrey concedes some variations in species and individuals, but concludes] there is not the variation one might expect. There are few exceptions to the rule that the need for identity is the most powerful. The need for stimulation is not far behind. And security, normally, will be sacrificed for either of the other two.<sup>1</sup>

One may think of the ironic similarity of the motto that Aldous Huxley provides for the scientific Utopia of **Brave New World**. It is "Community, Identity, Security," and it is a keynote to Huxley's portrayal of the loss of real identity achieved by the mass production of bodies, not persons; by dulling human reactions

<sup>1</sup>Taken from his article in **Life** (September 2, 1966), p. 58. The same statements are given somewhat different form in the book, **The Territorial Imperative** (New York, 1966), pp. 333-335.



with soma; by providing the artificial stimulation of feelie movies and surrogate pregnancies; by discouraging and at last exiling any show of extended human curiosity or even individualism. In short, Huxley poses the dangers of the sciences — biological and behavioral — being used to establish a happy, stable, "identified" society at the loss of a unique human nobility, a unique human purpose.

Now, to move at last to Joyce's treatment of a quest for identity, I would like to create an interpersonal relationship in this context by posing a fictitious reader, probably a collegiate reader, in the process of formulating his judgments of the theme of the novel, of the identity of the protagonist, of the "identity" of the author, and of the relevance to his own identity. With such a reader in mind, I would speculate that these complexities of identity would not instantly appear on first reading, for Stephen Daedalus does not at once appear as the more current "anti-hero," the protagonist struggling with the obstacles in his way, inept and apparently unsuccessful in his traumatic quest for identity. Instead, like most collegiate readers, probably you first respond by enjoying or not enjoying the book (and that is a valid esthetic response!), and probably enjoy it because you sympathize with and admire a protagonist who apparently surmounts the obstacles and apparently succeeds in achieving his identity. At this point you should move into the more complex stage of esthetic appreciation: more critical analysis of why you responded in such a way to the novel. This stage might even involve some critical analysis of yourself to ascertain what qualities in yourself made you respond to the qualities you see illustrated in the characters. You might speculate about the author's relation to the characters and ultimately to you.

There are a number of reasons why a contemporary and collegiate reader might not respond favorably to the novel, why you might not identify with Stephen Daedalus. First of all, Stephen matures in a time and place that could seem far removed from your American experience. That time period of the late nineteenth and very early twentieth century could seem very different from the crises of 1968. What's more, the place is Ireland, and the Irish diction and the frequent references to Irish history and politics (e.g., the material about Parnell) are not readily familiar to many readers. Too, Stephen is Catholic, undergoing a decidedly Catholic education. But, if I judge from the general collegiate reaction, you surmounted those difficulties of subject matter, and the reasons are perhaps more obvious and more easily recapitulated

— and, too, they illustrate how a good novel transcends the particulars of time and place to create a universal appeal. You are of the same age group as Stephen, have experienced those universals of childhood and of family relations, and, most crucially, are now at that stage emphasized in the novel: of Stephen as college student and intellectual. Some of you have inclinations toward being an artist, in that inclusive sense the term is given in the novel. But, most crucially, you are apt to identify with Stephen's maturing evaluations, his adolescent break with family, religion, and nation to formulate his own beliefs — in short, to establish his own identity. Very likely you are familiar with more "identifiable" American treatments of the same prevalent theme of rebellious maturation, e.g. Hemingway's Nick Adams and Salinger's Holden Caulfield and Glass family, so that you might appreciate Joyce's skill and grace at the same theme much earlier — in short, you might react like one Millsaps student who read the novel voluntarily because, as she said, she discovered within a few pages that it was "hallowed ground."

It may be Joyce's techniques, rather than subject matter, that you found disconcerting, right from the opening sentence. After all, an opening sentence of "Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a moocow coming down the road and this moocow that was coming down the road met a nice little boy named baby tuckoo . . ." hardly portends a serious novel. But you might well conclude that it is a very effective introduction to Joyce's skillful use of point of view throughout the novel. It is this point of view that offsets and helps to compensate for the other experimental techniques in the novel: the break from continuous narrative to the apparently disjointed episodes covering a broad span of time and experiences; the inclusions of expository material like the sermons and the expounding of Stephen's esthetic theory; and the shadowy characterization of everybody except Stephen, such as that of his girl friend, E. C. For surely it does not require special literary training to see that the novel focuses very exclusively on Stephen; all the experiences, all the other characters, all aspects of the external world are presented as he perceives them and as they relate to him.

Now, with more literary specialization, we might point out Joyce's eminence in techniques of point of view. The term means, in brief, how a writing is presented; and the usual methods are (1) a first person narrator, a character as "I" telling the story; (2) third person, either in an omniscient, detached portrayal deal-



ing equally with all characters as "he, she, they"; or with a "slant" to one character, still referred to as "he" although the emphasis is definitely on his perception, his reaction to and interpretation of events, even his thought processes; or (3) the most "modern" of techniques, the display of the consciousness, the actual mental contents, of a character, in an artistic imitation of the flux of consciousness: memory, perception, reasoning, presented in (usually) an unpunctuated, uncapitalized, mystifying but after all rather orderly and meaningful portrayal of a self. What you see in Joyce's **Portrait** is the midway point in his very influential innovations in point of view, from the fairly conventional first person narrator and third person omniscient techniques of **Dubliners** to those notorious tours de force of stream-of-consciousness illustrated in **Ulysses** and **Finnegans Wake**. The tricky combination in **Portrait** uses the third person slanted to indicate both an objective external world and Stephen's subjective reaction to it, and Joyce's skill affords an almost imperceptible shift from one area to the other. To illustrate, that dramatized opening stands at last as an item of Stephen's memory (perhaps first memory) and gives graphic evidence of a child's awakening judgment of experience. In fact, some critics argue that the first brief section of one and a half pages introduces all the major points in the entire novel. The following section, about Stephen's early school days, illustrates a marvelous merger of Stephen's childish perceptions and judgments of the present with memories of the past, plus the inclusion of emphasized points foreshadowing Stephen's future concerns, e.g., his preoccupation with language and with the news of Parnell's death — to paraphrase, the embryonic development of the artist-writer and the possible Irish nationalist. Though in later segments the presentation becomes more obviously Stephen's thinking, or more omniscient reporting of dialogue, or even a diary, the variation does not obscure the focus on Stephen. Even the supposedly objective images of the external world — like those elements of fire, air, earth, and water — are selectively used as they relate to Stephen.

In this kind of focus and treatment Joyce influenced later fictional techniques: the emphasis on individual consciousness as the only possible guide to a very relative reality; the portrayal of a self that, even with all the flux of mental contents and the fluidity of time and experience, could achieve a continuity and identity, the kind of identity that Stephen strives for. And in this respect, Joyce also illustrates a problem later authors certainly encounter: the tendency of readers to identify the authors, as actual

persons, with their created characters, even with those intended as negative examples. Several authors, like Faulkner, have found it necessary to state, That character is not saying (or thinking) what I think; some authors, like Salinger, have discreetly maintained an absolute silence; and some, like Hemingway (as many critics say) fatally succumbed to the public tendency to identify character with author — in this modern absence of author's commentary on and guidance to the "selves" he creates.

What we take up again here, of course, is the other end of that interpersonal relationship, the connection of author to character, with the suggestion that your estimate of Stephen Daedulus might not be the same as the author's, that your reaction to him might be different from the author's intended effect, and that your reaction to the novel some years from now might be different from your present one.

Even without external evidence, you might assume from the novel alone that Joyce is dealing with autobiographical material; with the available evidence, you could easily prove that Joyce is using his family, his friends, his education, his home towns with remarkable exactness. All this evidence would lead us to accept **Portrait** as a modern Wordsworthian **Prelude**, reporting the formation of Joyce himself as artist — and leaving the equation: Stephen is James Joyce. For example, that dramatic, rhetorical ending of the novel coincides with Joyce's own departure from Ireland to an expatriate existence in Europe. And all readers are attracted to that declaration of freedom and of mission. But there is evidence in the novel itself that the equation of Stephen and Joyce is not valid, and the characterization not the scant covering of author's identity that you find, for example, in Byron's **Childe Harold**. Here it is again appropriate to quote from Mr. Langbaum that "The Mysteries of Identity" in a context where he tells of W. B. Yeats' rejection of both the romantics' falsified, self-deluded personal utterance and the Victorian move to dramatic monologues and such. Says Langbaum, Yeats discovered that personal utterance had to have a conscious drama: "The only way to avoid self-deception and unconscious insincerity was to turn your life into a play and yourself and your friends into dramatis personae. That is what Yeats did with his friends, with Maud Gonne for example . . . It is his dramatized life and artfully masked self that Yeats draws upon for his great personal utterances."

Evidence certainly indicates that this process is just what Joyce did. In fact, there is a manuscript antedating **Portrait** by



ten years, completed in 1904 when Joyce was twenty-two (he was thirty-two when **Portrait** was completed), though it was not published till 1944, after Joyce's death. That manuscript is much more obviously autobiographical, more detailed, and most crucial, different in the portrayal of the protagonist who, in the title itself, is called **Stephen Hero**.

Even without the now-evident changes in selectivity of episode and detail, and in the refinement of writing techniques from **Stephen Hero** to **Portrait**, the major clue to the crucial change is given in that change of name from Stephen Hero to Stephen Daedulus. For, of course, it necessitates consideration of the Daedulus-Icarus myth: Stephen is the son of Daedulus: Does he stand in the novel as Daedulus, the artisan-artist-artificer breaking free to fulfill a noble mission, as most collegiate readers assume? Or is he Icarus, the rather foolish boy whose mistaken assurance and pride lead him to "fly too high" and destroy himself?

Now I might digress here to point out that aside from influencing the estimate of Stephen in **Portrait**, the use of that myth serves to reinforce the universal appeal, the archetypal figures, the timelessness of the experience — as any use of myth does. Of course, Joyce's more famous use of myth is in **Ulysses**, where he relates the fairly humdrum experience of Dubliner Leopold Bloom to the epic adventures in **The Odyssey**. And (just as we looked back to **Stephen Hero**) we might look at the re-appearance of Stephen Daedulus as Telemachus in Joyce's later novel — and there we would find that he has apparently produced nothing, accomplished no mission, is still in search of the "old father, old artificer," still in search of identity.

If that information from "outside" the **Portrait** upsets your original estimate of Stephen, you might find some consolation in these remarks by John V. Kelleher, from an essay titled "The Perceptions of James Joyce."<sup>2</sup> Opening with the comment that Joyce's present fame might fade, that conceivably someday Joyce might be as scorned as Tennyson is today, Mr. Kelleher nevertheless "predicts with confidence"

that when the rest of Joyce's books pass into temporary disfavor **A Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man** will go on being read, possibly as much as ever, by youths from eighteen to twenty-two. They will read it and recommend it to one

<sup>2</sup> In **Portraits of an Artist: A Casebook on James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man**, ed. William E. Morris and Clifford A. Nault, Jr. (New York, 1962), pp. 85-94.

another just as lads their age do now, and for the same reasons. That is, they will read it primarily as useful and reassuring revelation — not as literature, for they will be blind to its irony and its wonderful engineering, the qualities Joyce most labored to give it. They will use it as a magic mirror . . .

I remember that when I first encountered Stephen Daedulus I was twenty and I wondered how Joyce could have known so much about me . . . Perhaps about the third reading it dawned on me that Stephen was, after all, a bit of a prig; and to that extent I no longer identified myself with him. (How could I?) Quite a while later I perceived that Joyce knew that Stephen was a prig; that, indeed, he looked on Stephen with quite an ironic eye. So then I understood. At least I did until I had to observe that the author's glance was not one of unmixed irony. There was compassion in it too, as well as a sort of tender, humorous pride. By this time I was lecturing on Joyce, and I was having a terrible time with the book. I could not coordinate what I had to say about it; and the students, as their papers showed, were mostly wondering how Joyce could have known so much about them.

In that personal account there are three key words. First, Mr. Kelleher refers to the **wonderful engineering** of the novel, adding a bit later,

I was trying to examine separate parts of the book separately. There aren't any separate parts. One might as well attempt to study a man's gestures by pulling off his arm and dissecting it. The book is all of a piece, one organic whole. It is, as it were, written backwards and forwards and sideways and in depth, all at once.

That description of Joyce's structure can apply to many other modern novels as well, e.g., those of Faulkner, as does Mr. Kelleher's accompanying emphasis on Joyce's attitudes of **irony** and **compassion**. For, to review an earlier point, in the modern trend toward an invisible author, one who allows no obvious element of his subjective judgment in the work — one who, like Stephen's equation of God and artist, "refines himself out of existence," who "remains within, or behind, or beyond, or above his handiwork" — it is necessary to derive such attitudes from the engineering, the texture, the totality of the work.

For example, in **Portrait**, skilful engineering reiterates those concerns with family, religion, and nationality that mark Stephen's maturation — or lack of it. Sometimes these developments are shown very subtly. Do you see a continuity and significance in Stephen's attitudes toward women: the Virgin Mary, E. C., the girl in the sea, the woman in the hut? Do you see a continuity



and significance in the recurrent images of birds and bats, water, earth, even excrement? To summarize (and oversimplify), these repetitions disclose Stephen's inadequacy at maintaining any meaningful, harmonious relationships. It is the engineering of such things that reveals the esthetic distance between author and character while, paradoxically, communicating the author's ironic attitude and intention. The irony cited here is not the usual apparent discrepancy between what a character says and what the reader knows to be true, or the discrepancy between what a character expects and what really happens. It is the more subtle irony most often indicated by juxtaposition: a juxtaposition of characters or the even more subtle juxtaposition of episodes and images. The most obvious example is the sequence in which the compelling scene by the sea — where Stephen has his transcendent vision of the harmony of the earthly and spiritual, and accepts his role as creator-artist — is immediately followed by the grotesque household scene, with images of "watery tea," "crusts of fried bread," "dark turf-colored water." The sequence implies Stephen's failure to integrate experience, emphasizing his aversion to the mundane and sordid details of earthy existence. With similar indirection, the closing diary entries might be interpreted as a final emphasis on Stephen's crippling self-centeredness; what more egoistic form of writing is there than a diary?

But, as Mr. Kelleher noted, the irony is not absolute, and even to mellowed adults Stephen does not appear an unmitigated prig and callow youth. We too can sympathize with and admire the youthful rebel struggling to achieve his individual identity. He calls his country "the old sow that eats her farrow," but he also says, "This race and this country and this life produced me . . . I shall express myself as I am." Even when Stephen asserts with an attractive defiance, "When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets," there is an intriguing ambiguity in that choice of preposition at the last. Not the verb **escape** or the likely choices of **above** or **past** or **over**, but the preposition **by** which might suggest "by means of," using those very nets as support. The famous, rhetorical ending of the book, Stephen's farewell, has also a note of ambiguity. In declaring that "I go to encounter . . . the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race," Stephen reveals not just the goal of individual escapism but a sense of mission to "my race." Even if the "old artificer, old father" did not stand Stephen in good

stead, even if Stephen (according to the portrayal in *Ulysses*) still has not fully encountered or mastered the reality of experience, we can admire the goal and the effort toward its attainment.

As a final reminder of that interpersonal relationship of author and character and reader, I might first summarize those areas in which the author Joyce did exactly what Stephen did: he detached himself from the movement for Irish nationalism; he continued his preoccupation with language; he broke with his family; he broke with Catholicism and any organized religion; and he exiled himself to Europe. But, like Hemingway, who expatriated to Paris and wrote about Michigan; like Faulkner, who wrote two bad, imitative novels in New Orleans before discovering that his material lay in his own home town and county; like Baldwin, who lived in Europe and wrote about the experience of the American Negro, Joyce did not escape but used those nets. To the end of his days he wrote about Ireland and used those particulars of Ireland to represent all time, all places, all humanity. He portrayed aspects of the human condition to which all readers, regardless of their particular identities, can relate. Penetrating the modern, complex techniques of "identity," we find at last that Joyce's relationship as author to this novel reminds all of us readers, in our separate "quests for identity," that these "nets" of family, religion, nationality, and language are what we all fly by.



## A PREFACE TO A DISCUSSION OF H. RICHARD NIEBUHR'S THE RESPONSIBLE SELF<sup>1</sup>

By  
Dr. T. W. Lewis  
Associate Professor of Religion

Although I have not had the advantage of hearing the conversations and debates that have taken place in the colloquia this semester, I think it would be safe to assume that from time to time you have wrestled with the problem of defining the self. I would also imagine that a precise definition, satisfactory to all or even to the majority, has been an elusive thing. I do not purpose to solve this problem for you tonight; but hopefully, with the help of H. Richard Niebuhr, we might not only explore the structure and some of the key questions of the moral life, but also share the wisdom each of us might bring to the pivotal question of the human self.

From one point of view at least, the problem of defining the self is the problem of withdrawing or abstracting from that which one is attempting to define. The possibility of defining the self — and hence the desire to do so — lies in the fact that we humans are self-transcending creatures. I can, so to speak, stand outside of myself. I can reflect upon myself. I can consider the possibility of never having become the self that I am; or, I can contemplate the possibility of the time when my self will no longer be. Or, again, I can imagine the possibility of my being another self. Yet, my self-transcendence, that which makes it possible for me to contemplate all the possibilities of my self, is precisely that which makes a comprehensive and satisfactory definition of my self elusive. For the "I" that transcends the self in order to reflect upon the self is also **my** self. To put this another way, something of the subject — the true self that I am — that I want to observe in order to grasp it with clarity withdraws from my disposal when I stop to observe it and reflect upon it objectively.

Some would perhaps call this problem one of semantics, or might say that clarity could be gained by differentiating between the objective and subjective self. And in some measure that differentiation would be helpful. But I would suggest that, from one point of view, the problem lies in another direction. That is, that the process that goes on in objectifying thinking, e.g. when we seek to define the human self, separates the act of thinking

from the act of living, i.e. one is engaged in an abstraction, and hence, by definition, moves away from a vital dimension of the self. Now lest this be mistaken as the beginning of a polemic against rational, conceptual, abstract thought, I hasten to reassure you that it is not. It is an attempt, however, to point to a serious limitation with which we are confronted whenever we attempt a definition of the self. It is also to suggest that we might learn from poetry and myth something of the self that is not grasped by objectifying thinking.

As I read Richard Niebuhr, I see him approaching the question of the self primarily with the tools of the rational analyst. Thus, on the one hand, he offers what I would call a **constitutive** analysis of the self, i.e. how the self is constituted in its manifold and complex relations and contexts. On the other hand, he obviously has in view a **functional** analysis of the self that is suggested in his notion of the moral life as a self-judging and self-guiding activity.

But in the service of this analytical approach, I note another way of talking about the self. And I would call this the confessional mode. It is a way of speaking in which an experience is confessed which can be verified by another self primarily as it evokes a response of recognition in the other. Here I refer to that which is an important theme in Niebuhr's chapter "The Self in Absolute Dependence," that which he calls "the radical deed."

The radical action whereby we are ourselves in the here and now, as thus and so, cannot be classified in that series of actions of finite powers to which we respond in accordance with our more or less enlightened interpretations. We can interpret the questions addressed to us by companions. We can understand the meaning of the action in which a companion wounds our bodies or our feelings. We can ask what this action means in its larger context (not only what he consciously means by it), and so interpreting we can make a more fitting reply. But how is the self to interpret the radical action that flings it into existence and holds it there? It cannot refer back to events in which something similar happened to it; it cannot use analogies, saying that this action is something like another action it has experienced before. The experience is unique, though it is repeated by millions of selves (p. 115).

In this experience the limits of the self are grasped with the mind, to be sure, but also and at the same time they are grasped with the heart, the liver, and the bones. It is the existential awareness of the radical contingency of one's own self. The experience of

<sup>1</sup> *The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).



the self on this level occurs with the insight that one cannot move "from the impersonal statements that thinking is going on, or that living is in process, or that feeling occurs, to the conclusion that therefore I am" (p. 110). Here we might say: I know myself as a being that is thrown by a "whatever it is" that has cast me into being, and upon which my self is absolutely dependent both for being and for the possibility of not-being.

Niebuhr's discussion of the self leaves much — and for some, no doubt, too much — out of account. But it has the merit of not only bringing into focus, through analysis by means of the symbol of the responsible self, the agencies and contexts by which the self is constituted, and the fundamental actions of the self, but also it views that dimension of the self from which one cannot abstract himself.

Now I would like to probe the subject matter under consideration by coming at it from another direction. I do this by raising the fundamental question that is behind all the fundamental questions we ask as selves in the act of living: How is it possible for me, as I look into the depths of life, as I see the ambiguities of sorrow and joy, of cruelty and kindness, of love and hate, of ugliness and beauty running through the whole of existence, how is it possible for me to respond to life in affirmation, with integrity, in wholeness of being in my responses to all actions upon me in time and history?

According to Niebuhr's analysis of the responsible self, I respond to actions upon me by interpreting the meaning of those actions and also by anticipating reactions to my responses in a context that expands finally to include a universal society and that refers to the "universal other." He tells me that the way I interpret this ultimate radically conditions my responses in the immediate context of my actions. Moreover, he states that as a rule the self interprets the ultimate context either as hostile or indifferent to the self, or at least as a hostile context in which some benevolent power resides to which the self appeals against the overpowering enmity. And indeed this seems to be the case with nations and societies as well as selves. For example, walking across the campus on that idyllic spring day that was Tuesday morning, it was not at all difficult for me to affirm that everything that is is good. The signs and signals were everywhere — in the clear sky, the cool breeze, the fragrance of the vegetation, the expressions of human affection in abundance under every green tree. But a "crack" in this interpretation appeared when a mangy dog

crossed the walk ahead of me with a young squirrel in his mouth that he had just torn and killed. I was reminded that nature was also "red tooth and claw." Moreover, I cannot forget that human beings are starving in the Delta, that our leaders deny it, and I, like the latter, had a splendid dinner. I cannot forget that children are victims of napalm in Vietnam because they must be guaranteed freedom from brutal communism. This is to say that I discriminate between the good and the bad, and in doing so find that the clues and signals from life by no means justify the interpretation that the ultimate context is good.

But according to Niebuhr, the divisions and disunity of the self root in the posture of distrust that is taken as a rule toward the ultimate context of our selfhood. On the one hand, we look upon some of our colleagues as our friends — the members of our fraternity, the people who share our interests, those who tell us that we are "okay." But others are threats or potential threats to us — members of another fraternity, people who consider our concerns as trite, or at least with indifference, those who do not tell us we are "okay." And even among our friends there are those who threaten us, e.g., we compete for honors and prizes, those to whom we entrust our love sometimes betray us, or a friend passes judgment upon us. Or, again, we consider the well-being of the nation of which we are a part. On the one hand, other nations some of the time appear to contribute to and support our interests and at other times menace our existence as they attack our policies and oppose our actions. Or, again, we experience the conflicting demands that are placed upon us, as well as the conflict between different goals we pursue, and we know the anxiety that arises as we anticipate the guilt awaiting us in the future as "right strives with right." The demands of one's vocation as student or teacher clash with the demands he knows as a member of a family unit. The demands that are laid upon us as citizens of a nation clash with those we encounter as citizens of the world. The goal of peace clashes with that of security, the demands of mercy with those of justice. **And it is through these that the ultimate context of our actions is mediated to us.** Some people and some contexts do suggest that life is trustworthy, but not all of the time and certainly not finally, since death awaits all men and, if we have learned anything from history, all societies as well.

The possibility of an orientation other than that of distrust seems remote in the face of such ambiguity, and a posture other than that of defensiveness unlikely. Thus Niebuhr's analysis, on



the one hand, appears to lead to the conclusion that the self is condemned to self-contradiction and disunity, as distrust and defensiveness produce isolation that fosters conflict and symbolizes the disunity in the self and in human community. On the other hand, he points to the possibility of unity in the self through a radical reinterpretation of the ultimate context based on the word that everything that is is good — a reinterpretation that he finds given pre-eminently in Jesus, but also evidenced in some who do not bear the name of Christ.

Now if such a reinterpretation is the basis for the unity of the self in its self-understanding and moral action, then it would be relevant to follow the contours of Niebuhr's thought to the question of the response the self makes to the concrete problems encountered in living. Where does this analysis and its implications leave the self? And in what respect do we get help in making the decisions that life thrusts upon us?

MILLSAPS COLLEGE  
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39210

# Millsaps College Summer School Bulletin



**SUMMER SESSION 1968**

**First Term    June 8 - July 13**

**Second Term    July 15 - August 17**



# MILLSAPS COLLEGE SUMMER SESSION 1968

## EXPENSES

### Tuition per term:

Five semester hours or less, each hour -----	\$ 25.00
Six or seven semester hours -----	\$150.00

### Laboratory fees, per term:

Biology -----	\$ 10.00
Chemistry -----	\$ 10.00
Geology -----	\$ 10.00
Modern Languages -----	\$ 5.00
Physical Education 201, 202, 221, 222 -----	\$ 2.00
Physics -----	\$ 10.00

### Room and Board, per term:

Dormitory Room -----	\$ 30.00
Board, optional -----	\$ 60.00

### Summary of Expenses:

	1 5-week Term	2 5-week Terms
Day students, full load (tuition only) -----	\$150.00	\$300.00
Dormitory Students, full load, including board -----	\$240.00	\$480.00

### Housing and Board

Adequate college housing is available for both men and women. Dormitories are air-conditioned. All out-of-town students must live on campus unless they have written permission from the Office of Student Personnel to live off campus. No first-semester freshmen are permitted to live in fraternity houses.

Meals are served in the College cafeteria and in the grill. The boarding plan, which is optional, provides economical regular meals from Sunday supper through Friday lunch at \$60.00 per term.



SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

FIRST TERM					SECOND TERM				
7:30 - 9:00 Classes									
Course Title	Course No.	Sem. Hrs.	Description	Instructor	Course No.	Sem. Hrs.	Description	Instructor	Room Both Terms
Biology	211	4	Comparative Anatomy	Perry	(Ten weeks)				SH-226
Chemistry	254	4	Analytical I (Quantitive)	Berry	262	4	Pre-Med Physical	Bishop	SH-153
*Economics	201	3	Principles	Nicholas	202	3	Principles	Nicholas	F-21
Education	331	3	Music for Children	Mrs. Byler					Music Hall
*English	101	3	Composition	Collins	102	3	Composition	Dean	M-303
**French	201	3	Intermediate French	Horan	202	3	Intermediate French	Horan	M-22
*Geology	101	3	Physical Geology (w/lab)	Johnson	102	3	Historical Geology (w/lab)	Johnson	SH-055
History	305	3	South to the Civil War	Sallis	306	3	South after the Civil War	Sallis	M-301
					308	3	Mississippi and Its Relation to the South	Sallis	M-301
**Latin	201	3	Intermediate Latin	Coulet	202	3	Intermediate Latin	Coulet	CC-28
*Mathematics	103	3	Foundations of Mathematics	McKenzie	104	3	Foundations of Mathematics	McKenzie	SH-013
*Mathematics	111	3	College Algebra	Ritchie	112	3	Trigonometry	Ritchie	SH-015
Philosophy	201	3	Problems of Philosophy	Bergmark	311	3	Ethics	Mitias	CC-24
*Phys. Ed.	201	1	Golf	Montgomery	202	1	Golf	Davis	Gym
*Phys. Ed.	221	1	Tennis	Montgomery	222	1	Tennis	Davis	Gym
*Phys. Ed.	332	3	Hygiene	Edge	332	3	Hygiene	Ranager	Gym
Religion	201	3	The Old Testament	Anding	202	3	The New Testament	Anding	CC-21
Religion	401	3	Studies in Contemporary Theology	Lewis					CC-11
*Spanish	101	3	Beginning Spanish	Bufkin	102	3	Beginning Spanish	Bufkin	M-21
9:05 - 10:35 Classes									
Accounting	281	3	Introduction	Staff	282	3	Introduction	Staff	F-21
*Biology	111	4	General Botany	Nevins	112	4	General Botany	Nevins	SH-213
Chemistry	331S	4	Organic Chemistry	Cain	332S	4	Organic Chemistry	Cain	SH-153
Education	211	3	Mathematics in the Elementary School	Meaders	303	3	Language Arts in the Elementary School	Meaders	M-302
Education	362	3	High School Methods	R. E. Moore	372	3	Principles of Secondary Educ.	Moore	CC-25
*English	101	3	Composition	Blackwell	102	3	Composition	Blackwell	M-303
English	201	3	English Literature	Collins	202	3	English Literature	Dean	M-304
English	367	3	Milton	Boyd	350	3	Major American Writers	Callen	M-113
*French	101	3	Elementary French	Horan	102	3	Elementary French	Horan	M-22
*Geography	105	3	Physical Geography	Johnson	205	3	Economic Geography	Johnson	SH-055
*German	201	3	Intermediate German	Guest	202	3	Intermediate German	Staff	M-305
*History	101	3	Western Civilization	Sallis	102	3	Western Civilization	Sallis	M-301
History	321	3	Problems in Modern History	R. H. Moore	322	3	Problems in Modern History	R. H. Moore	CC-11
*Latin	101	3	Elementary Latin	Coulet	102	3	Elementary Latin	Coulet	CC-28
Mathematics	213	3	Plane Analytic Geometry	Ritchie					SH-013
Mathematics	313	3	Calculus Is (Differential)	Knox	314	3	Calculus IIs (Integral)	Knox	SH-015
*Phys. Ed.	201	1	Golf	Edge	202	1	Golf	Ranager	Gym
*Phys. Ed.	221	1	Tennis	Edge	222	1	Tennis	Ranager	Gym
*Physics	101	3	General Phys. (M., T., W., Th.)	Galloway	102	3	Gen. Phys. (M., T., W., Th.)	Galloway	SH-115
Physics	131	4	General Physics	Galloway	132	4	General	Galloway	SH-115
*Political Sci.	101	3	Amer. Govt.: Institutions	Staff	102	3	Amer. Govt.: Functions	Staff	CC-31
Psychology	202	3	Introduction to Psychology	Staff	302	3	Dynamics of Human Behavior	Staff	SH-032
Religion	201	3	The Old Testament	Reiff	381	3	Comparative Religion	Reiff	CC-24
*Sociology	101	3	Introduction to Sociology	Coker	102	3	Modern American Society	Coker	F-01
*Speech	101	3	Public Speaking	Hooker	102	3	Oral Reading	Hooker	CC-5
Speech	301	3	Interpretation of Drama	Goss					CC-4
10:40 - 12:10 Classes									
*Biology	101	3	General Biology	Nevins	102	3	General Biology	Nevins	SH-213
*Chemistry	111	4	General Chemistry	Cain	112	4	General Chemistry	Bishop	SH-153
Economics	251	3	Legal Environment of Business	Staff	252	3	Legal Environment of Business	Staff	F-21
Education	204	3	Human Growth and Devel.	R. E. Moore	352	3	Educational Psychology	R. E. Moore	CC-25
Education	321	3	Social Studies in the Elementary School	Meaders	301	3	Literature for Children	Meaders	M-302
English	201	3	English Literature	Blackwell	202	3	English Literature	Callen	M-303
English	361	3	Chaucer	Boyd	397	3	Advanced Grammar and Composition	Blackwell	M-113
*German	101	3	Elementary German	Guest	102	3	Elementary German	Staff	M-305
*History	201	3	History of the U. S.	R. H. Moore	202	3	History of the U. S.	R. H. Moore	M-301
*Mathematics	106	3	Mathematics for Teachers	McKenzie	341	3	Vectors and Matrices	Ritchie	SH-013
Mathematics	351	3	Differential Equations	Knox	172	3	Statistics	Knox	SH-015
Philosophy	*202	3	Logic	Bergmark	201	3	Problems of Philosophy	Mitias	CC-24
*Phys. Ed.	201	1	Golf	Montgomery	202	1	Golf	Davis	Gym
*Phys. Ed.	221	1	Tennis	Montgomery	222	1	Tennis	Davis	Gym
*Physics	151	1	General Physics Lab., TBA	Galloway	152	1	General Physics Lab., TBA	Galloway	SH-115
*Physics	351	1	Photography, TBA	Galloway	351	1	Photography, TBA	Galloway	SH-115
Psychology	206	3	Social Psychology	Staff	202	3	Introduction to Psychology	Staff	SH-032
Religion	201	3	The Old Testament	Lewis	202	3	The New Testament	Anding	CC-21
*Spanish	201	3	Intermediate Spanish	Bufkin	202	3	Intermediate Spanish	Bufkin	M-22
Sociology	*203	3	Social Problems	Coker	301	3	Marriage and the Family	Coker	F-01
*Speech	103	3	Introduction to Theatre	Goss	104	3	Introduction to Theatre	Goss	CC-4
Mathematics 300, Computers and Computer Programming, meets Tuesdays and Thursdays from 6:00 to 8:45 p.m. at the Computer Center of the Research and Development Center, Lakeland Drive. Mr. Mapp, Instructor. 3 semester hours credit.				Geology 100, Earth Sciences, meets in SH-056 from 8:00 to 11:00 four days a week; 7:30 - 12:00 field trip one day a week. Dr. Snowden, Director. 6 semester hours or one high school unit.				Theatre 171-172, Theatre Workshop, meets daily at 1:30 p.m. in CC-4. Mr. Goss, Director. 3 credit hours per semester.	

\* Courses open to freshmen.

\*\* Intermediate courses in foreign languages open to freshmen who have had two years of the same language.

LABORATORY SESSIONS, WHERE REQUIRED, WILL BE ARRANGED AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CLASS.



# MILLSAPS COLLEGE

## SUMMER SESSION 1968

FIRST TERM  
SECOND TERM

JUNE 8 - JULY 13  
JULY 15 - AUGUST 17

### GENERAL INFORMATION

#### WHY SUMMER SCHOOL?

- Millsaps Summer School is designed to serve—
- High school graduates who will enter college this fall
  - Regular students working toward a degree at Millsaps College
  - Visiting college students who desire to earn credits for transfer to other institutions
  - Teachers who need courses for certification requirements
  - College students and others who desire work in specialized areas

#### REGISTRATION

Application blanks may be obtained by writing to Director of the Summer School, Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi 39210. Preregistration is advisable.

High School graduates attending for the first time must supply a complete transcript.

College students entering Millsaps for the summer terms only must provide a statement of eligibility from the dean or registrar of the last school attended.

#### TRANSFERRING CREDITS

To transfer credit earned during the summer, a written request must be filed with the registrar of Millsaps College.

#### OFFERINGS

All courses listed will be offered, but the College reserves the right to withdraw a course if there is insufficient registration or to change instructors if necessary.

#### CLASS LOAD

The maximum load a student may take is seven semester hours in one term, fourteen semester hours in two terms.

#### SCHEDULE OF CLASSES AND EXAMINATIONS

Regular classes meet every weekday morning. Laboratory sessions, where applicable, are scheduled chiefly for afternoons.

During the first term, classes will meet two Saturdays: June 15 and July 6. Final examinations will be given Saturday, July 13. July 4 will be a holiday.

During the second term, classes will meet one Saturday: July 20. Final examinations will be given Saturday, August 17.

#### ATTENDANCE

The number of class sessions has been reduced to a minimum consistent with the desired academic attainment. Students are therefore expected to be present for each class session. Instructors may exclude students from a class and withhold credit for excessive absence.

#### Air-Conditioning

Library, classrooms, cafeteria, and dormitory facilities are air-conditioned.

Note: During the summer session no scholarships are available, and no reductions in tuition are made. National Defense Student Loans are available to students enrolled full time in the spring or fall semester of 1968.

### SPECIAL PROGRAMS

#### EARTH SCIENCES

During the first term (June 10-July 13) a Survey of Earth Sciences offers to academically talented high school students a special program of study in geology, meteorology, oceanography, astronomy. Twelve lecture-laboratory sessions and one field trip each week. Tuition \$95. For further information write to the Director of the Summer School.

#### MUSIC COURSES

Summer study in voice may be arranged with Mr. Jensen; in piano with Mr. Polanski.

#### SPECIAL MUSIC STUDY COURSE

The Frances Clark Study Course — Concentrated study in piano pedagogy, conducted by the New School for Music Study — will be held August 11-16. Fees: \$68 audit or \$78 for 2 semester hours college credit. Room and board available. Instructors: Frances Clark, Richard Chronister, Louise Goss, Elmer Heerema.

#### COMPUTER PROGRAMMING

An eight-week course in Computers and Computer Programming (Mathematics 300) will be offered two nights each week from June 11 through August 1 in conjunction with the Mississippi Research and Development Center. Classes will meet at the R & D Center. Enrollment limited to 30; 3 hours credit; laboratory fee \$20.00.

#### WORKSHOP IN THEATRE

The Class in Theatre 171-172 will stage a major production each term of the summer session. Also, some opportunities for participation in the productions by students in other summer courses, on a non-credit basis. Classes and rehearsals every afternoon. 3 credit hours each semester.

#### GULF COAST RESEARCH LABORATORY

Gulf Coast Research Laboratory courses are recognized for full credit.

#### THE REGULAR SESSION

Students interested in attending during the regular session should contact the Director of Admissions, Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi 39210. The fall term will open September 7, 1968.





# MILLSAPS COLLEGE



**INVITES  
HIGH SCHOOL JUNIORS AND SENIORS  
TO ATTEND**



## HIGH SCHOOL DAY



**SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23**

### High School Day Agenda

- 8:00 a.m. Registration  
Reception  
Refreshments
- 9:00 a.m. Entertainment and  
Convocation
- 9:45 a.m. Scholarship Tests  
(Optional) or  
Guided Tours
- 11:30 a.m. Lunch
- 12:30 p.m. Conferences with  
Faculty and Staff
- 2:00 p.m. Variety Show
- 3:15 p.m. Visits to Houses of  
Social Groups
- 5:00 p.m. "Dutch" Supper
- 8:15 p.m. All-Campus Party



## Scholarships Available

Competitive scholarship tests will be given on High School Day, Saturday, November 23. Students scoring highest will be awarded Marion L. Smith Scholarships, named for the distinguished former president of Millsaps College.

Forty scholarships totaling \$6,200 will be given as follows:

Two \$500 awards

Two \$400 awards

Four \$300 awards

Twenty-two \$100 scholarships to seniors from high schools outside the city of Jackson

Ten \$100 scholarships to seniors from high schools within the city of Jackson

Additional special scholarships will be awarded to qualified students. For detailed information about the total scholarship program, write Mr. J. L. Woodward, Chairman of the Awards Committee, Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi, 39210.

## Facts About Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi

Recognized recently by the Ford Foundation as a "regional center of excellence."

A private liberal arts college supported by the Methodist Church, founded in 1890 and named in honor of its chief benefactor, Major R. W. Millsaps.

Fully accredited by all appropriate standardizing and accrediting agencies, both regional and national.

Small (less than 1,000) student body, allowing close student-faculty relationships.

Located in the state capital on one hundred acres of tree-shaded land on one of the highest points in the city.

Lists eight social groups, sixteen honor societies, a weekly newspaper, a yearbook, a literary magazine, an active drama organization, three choral groups, an intercollegiate and intramural sports program, a debate team, an opera workshop.

Offers Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Music, and Bachelor of Science degrees in twenty-five areas of specialization.

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